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COMMENTARY ON "ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES WITHOUT UNIONS"
MATTHEW W. FINKIN*
Professor Samuel Estreicher contemplates the prospect, in an in-
creasingly nonunionized world of work, of a broadened use of arbitration
to resolve employment disputes: in bilateral contracts of employment; in
unilaterally promulgated employer policies; and as mandated by a state
law of wrongful dismissal.1 In this, he has performed a masterful and
meticulous anatomy of the issues. Nevertheless, some comment on the
former two questions in particular may place what Professor Estreicher
has so assiduously and helpfully explored in a somewhat different light.
I. THE UNHELPFUL ROLE OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT
(FAA)
I start with what Professor Estreicher terms a "first cut ' 2 on the
question, that of a written bilateral contract of employment between two
relatively sophisticated parties. Let us assume that K has been hired for
a key corporate position of Vice President for Transportation. 3 The posi-
tion is a "sophisticated" one involving a large salary, a package of bene-
fits, severance pay, deferred compensation, and stock options;
accordingly, the employment contract was negotiated and drafted with
the advice and assistance of experienced legal counsel and signed by both
parties. The contract stated inter alia that K agreed to arbitrate "any
dispute, claim or controversy arising out of my employment or the termi-
nation of my employment." Some months later, K was diagnosed as
having breast cancer and was hospitalized. When she sought to return to
work she was summarily discharged. She has sued her former employer
in state court (all administrative prerequisites having been exhausted)
for: (1) termination in breach of her contract of employment; (2) termi-
nation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on the
ground that a discharge because of breast cancer constitutes a form of sex
discrimination; (3) termination in violation of the state's Human Rights
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
753 (1990).
2. Id. at 763.
3. The hypothetical is based, if loosely, on DeSapio v. Josephthal & Co., 143 Misc. 2d 611, 540
N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Law, which forbids discrimination on grounds of disability; and, (4) the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her erstwhile em-
ployer has moved to stay the judicial proceeding and refer all claims to
arbitration.
If her contract of employment evidenced "a transaction involving
commerce" under section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, and was not
exempt under section 1 of that Act, then federal law would govern the
disposition of the employer's motion. Accordingly, Professor Estreicher
explains why the first claim, of wrongful dismissal, should be submitted
to arbitration: The parties have freely agreed to substitute the arbitral
forum for a jury trial; arbitration is swifter and potentially cheaper than a
lawsuit; and the parties jointly select the decision maker, perhaps on
grounds of special competence. There are, to be sure, disadvantages:
There is no pre-trial discovery in arbitration; the arbitrator may be biased
by his or her desire for future selection, especially where the employer is
likely to be a "repeat player" with respect to future arbitrations involving
other employees; and the scope of arbitral remedial power remains fully
to be seen. But Professor Estreicher argues that these disadvantages--of
which one would expect K to have been fully informed by counsel-
should not override the freely chosen forum of the parties.
What of the remaining claims of violation of federal and state labor
protective legislation, and what of a departure from the norms of civi-
lized behavior ordinarily to be ascertained by the community's sense of
outrage by means of a civil jury? On the remaining claims Professor
Estreicher finds that the FAA, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, beclouds the analysis of the federal claim and unjustifi-
ably preempts the state claims. As he explains:
The difficulty arises because the Supreme Court has given the FAA a
rather broad sweep. The FAA, according to the Court, is not a nar-
rowly-conceived statute simply repudiating the anti-arbitration prem-
ises of state common law. The FAA also overrides any contrary state
policy in favor of preserving access to the courts for particular claims;
and, on the federal level, acts as a kind of meta-statute enforcing arbi-
tration of claims under federal statutes that do not expressly or by
implication insulate forum-choice decisions from private bargaining. 4
His argument seems to me irrefutable. One cannot discern any fed-
eral interest in having individual employees arbitrate state public law
claims, grounded in tort or statute, despite the state's policy to the con-
trary, which is exactly what the Court's reading of the FAA has re-
quired. Nor does the Act's strong presumption of arbitrability, which
4. Estreicher, supra note 1, at 776.
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potentially reaches the federal statutory claim, clarify analysis of the real
issue presented. Thus Professor Estreicher finds it "tempting" 5 to read
section 1 as exempting employment contracts altogether from the reach
of the FAA. He shrinks from that temptation, however, in part because
it is not always clear that "unsophisticated" and relatively weak employ-
ees would invariably be "better off with a rule requiring resort to the civil
courts rather than arbitration to pursue their statutory claims," and in
part because,
A broad exclusion of employment contracts from the reach of the
FAA and cognate state laws would not be confined to workers seeking
to enforce minimum-wage obligations under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA); it would also include highly-placed management officials
suing under express contracts and the mid-level management employ-
ees who are typical claimants under ADEA. 6
The assumption seems to be that the exemption of employment contracts
from the reach of the FAA would drive a similar exemption from "cog-
nate state laws" so to require all statutory claims to be heard judicially.
That may or may not be a sound result-more on that later-but I do
not think that it would be compelled by reading employment contracts
out of the FAA.
The FAA exemption speaks not at all to "cognate" state laws.
Some state laws do exempt employment contracts, 7 though even here
such language has been read on occasion as referring only to collective
agreements.8 But most state laws, I suspect, following the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act, do not exempt employment contracts. 9 Most state laws re-
quire the enforcement of written agreements to arbitrate future disputes
simpliciter.10 Thus the removal of the FAA as generally controlling fed-
eral law on arbitration would say nothing at all to whether the federal
labor protective claim is amenable to arbitration under an individual con-
tract of employment, in the sense of arbitration as preclusive of a later de
novo judicial determination.
Let us return to K. Assume that her contract, as Vice President for
Transportation, is exempt under the prevailing reading of section 1 of the
5. Id. at 782.
6. Id. at 782-83.
7. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1517 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-108-201
(1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1(2)(b) (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (c)(2)
(Supp. 1990); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 788.01 (West 1981).
8. See, e.g., Wilson v. McGrow, Pridgeon & Co., P.A., 298 Md. 66, 467 A.2d 1025 (1983).
9. UNIFORM ARBITRATION AcT § 17 U.L.A. 5 (1985).
10. As does Illinois, which has adopted the Uniform Act, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, para. 101
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); and, New York, which has not, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 7501 (McKin-
ney 1980).
1990]
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FAA, as for work in the interstate transportation industry. I The arbi-
tration provision in her contract would not be governed by the FAA.
Consequently, the FAA would have nothing to say to the employer's
motion to refer her Title VII, state Human Rights Law, contract, and
tort claims to arbitration. The latter three would be-as they properly
are-questions of state law. But whether the Title VII claim should be
so referred (in the sense adverted to above) would be a question of federal
law; that is, if the state reads the employment contract's "arising out of"
clause to sweep in the Title VII claim, then whether Title VII itself per-
mits the claim to be so swept, or rather, the consequences of an arbitra-
tion for a subsequent lawsuit would ultimately have to be decided by the
United States Supreme Court.
In other words, Professor Estreicher rightly concludes that the cur-
rent state of FAA doctrine, at least as applied to individual contracts of
employment, is indefensible: the contemporary reading of the scope of
the exemption, as limited to transportation workers, is the least persua-
sive of the available statutory readings; the strong presumption of arbi-
trability as to federal statutory claims is unhelpful; and the Act's
preemptive effect vis-a-vis state employment law is unjustifiable. The
necessary conclusion, I submit, is that the Act ought to be read as inap-
plicable to contracts of individual employment.
First, that conclusion best comports with the text. The Act exempts
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."' 2 This
seems plain on its face.
Second, as Archibald Cox has observed, the language was chosen at
a time when the commerce power-the limit of the Act's reach---ex-
tended to the employment of seamen and railroadmen, but not to em-
ployees engaged for the manufacture of goods for shipment in interstate
commerce.' 3 Though, as Professor Estreicher's review of the legislative
history suggests, the exemption may well have been intended to reach
collective agreements or industrial disputes, the means chosen to effect
that end made no reference to industrial disputes or "trade agreements,"
11. This reading of the exemption has been acquiesced in by the United States Supreme Court.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 n.7 (1967). See Wilder v.
Whittaker Corp., 169 Cal. App. 3d 969, 215 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986)
(contract of employment of "travel supervisor" for assignment abroad is not covered by the FAA).
But see Hydrick v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 1434 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (work in
personnel placement, affecting the employment of people in interstate commerce, is not "tantamount
to transportation of goods in foreign or interstate commerce," id. at 1435, and so is governed by the
FAA).
12. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
13. Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REv. 591, 598 (1954).
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as collective bargaining agreements were then called,4 but took the form
of a partial retreat from the full scope of the then understanding of the
commerce power. From this perspective, a court proceeded in historical
ignorance when it recently observed, in affirming the exemption as lim-
ited to transportation workers, that, "[I]f Congress had intended to ex-
clude all employment contracts from the Act, it would have been
unnecessary to identify specific categories of workers."1 5 What the ex-
emption says is not that "seamen, railroad and others engaged in like
work" are exempt, but that "seamen, railroad and other like workers"-
those in foreign and interstate commerce-are exempt; that is, all those
over whom Congress could have exercised commerce power jurisdiction
if it chose, but prudentially declined so to do.
Third, this reading achieves the objectives Professor Estreicher
desires, and with the least difficulty: it would not require the Court to
abandon the FAA's strong presumption in favor of arbitration; it would
not require that employment contracts be distinguished from commercial
contracts in terms of sweeping in federal statutory claims or to abandon
that sweeping effect generally; it would not require the Court to abandon
the preemption of state claims or to distinguish employment from com-
mercial transactions for the purposes of that preemptive effect. The
abandonment or modification of these larger doctrines might well be de-
sirable but a close reading of the text for employment contracts reserves
those questions for another day.
Finally, the withdrawal of the FAA from individual employment
contracts would say nothing at all to what controlling federal law should
be when a claim of violation of a federal labor protective provision con-
fronts the arbitration clause in an employment contract. It is to that
question that attention should turn.
II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC LAW
Estreicher argues that if a sophisticated employee can waive her
rights by substituting an arbitrator for a jury (or judge) to hear a com-
mon-law claim, such as breach of contract, why should she not be able
voluntarily to substitute a private for a public forum for the disposition
of statutory claims that are for her benefit, so long as the process is sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny to assure that the result is within statutory
bounds? Even here one can entertain doubts. An effective waiver of con-
stitutional due process rights has been conditioned upon a finding that
14. See F. SAYRE, LABOR LAW ch. XIII (1923).
15. Hydrick, 738 F. Supp. at 1435.
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the waiver is "knowing and voluntary."1 6 One would think the waiver of
a judicial forum in which to vindicate one's statutory civil rights would
be conditioned upon no lesser standard. Yet Professor Estreicher does
not address the question of the extent to which the individual must be
made aware of the full purport of a general "arising out of" clause before
such a clause may sweep in federal labor protective law; whether, for
example, in the course of negotiations-or in the contract itself-the pre-
cise provisions the individual is agreeing to arbitrate must have been ex-
pressly enumerated so to work a "knowing" waiver. Nor does he address
whether any assessment of the relative bargaining positions of the parties
needs to be made, in order to account for the "voluntariness" of the
waiver.
More important, Professor Estreicher would draw no distinction for
less sophisticated employees, so long as the individual is employed under
a bilateral contract. As he explains, "[T]he terms of the agreement may
be the same for all employees in a given job category," 1 7 that is, a form
contract that all employees, or all employees of a particular class, must
sign as a condition of employment. Professor Estreicher would enforce
this contract by analogy to the paradigm of an arms length bargained for
contract of employment between sophisticated parties:
There are, of course, circumstances calling for invocation of the con-
tract-law doctrines of unconscionability and duress. But there are
costs to depriving parties to an employment contract from freely shap-
ing the terms of their relationship.' 8
In this situation, however, it is the employer that has the power to
condition employment upon the substitution of a private for a public fo-
rum on the question of the employer's own conduct being offensive to
public policy-a forum that contemplates no pre-trial discovery, that
may suffer from possible bias in favor of the employer as a repeat player,
and the extent or effectiveness of whose remedial authority remains fully
to be seen. 19 Nor do the contract doctrines adverted to temper this re-
sult. One is rarely coerced into entering an employment relationship,
and coercion of some sort has been thought essential to render an em-
16. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick, Co., 405 U.S. 174,
185-86 (1972).
17. Estreicher, supra note 1, at 768.
18. Id. at 782.
19. Professor Estreicher notes Professor West's study for the proposition that the effectiveness
of reinstatement is affected by how swiftly the grievant is given that remedy, presumably on the
assumption that such would be the remedy here as it is under collective bargaining agreements.
Estreicher, supra note I at 763 n.32 (citing West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Dis-
charge, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1). But the thrust of her study is that reinstatement is a dubious
remedy in the absence of a union.
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ployment contract voidable on grounds of "duress." 20 Neither would the
doctrine of "unconscionability" place a significant limit on the em-
ployer's ability to command such an agreement. The doctrine rarely
finds expression in employment law. Unconscionability is grounded on
the idea that contract terms that are so unreasonably favorable to the
drafting party-that, in some jurisdictions, are" 'so outrageous and un-
fair' "21 as to shock the conscience or to violate public policy22-are
voidable. But the very question presented is whether public policy
should allow labor protective laws to be swept under such boilerplate
contracts. To ask whether such a provision is or is not "unconscionable"
is merely to restate the issue.
I am dubious that because a "sophisticated" employee, such as exec-
utive K, might freely choose a provision expressly governing federal pro-
tective law-a proposition by no means self-evident-then employers
may effectively command such a provision for less sophisticated employ-
ees, such as K's secretary or mail room clerk. Professor Estreicher seems
troubled by the extension of his argument, for he would draw a distinc-
tion between written bilateral employment contracts and a set of em-
ployer policies that provide for arbitration as the final step of a
unilaterally promulgated grievance system. The distinction will not hold
up.
Professor Estreicher observes first, as a descriptive matter, that such
employer policies would not be governed by the FAA (or cognate state
law) "because of the absence of 'an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy.' 23 Then, Estreicher observes as a
prescriptive matter that such an arbitration should be confined to claims
based upon the employer's policies. It is one thing, he argues, to enforce
an employer's policy that works a unilateral contract governing the em-
20. H. SPECTER & M. FINKIN, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LmGATIoN § 1.75
(1989) [hereinafter SPECTER & FINKN].
21. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 669, 673 (10th Cir. 1990), cerm denied, 111 S. Ct.
788 (1991). ("Thus, unfairness alone is not enough--the unfairness must rise to a level of outrage or
contravene public policy.").
22. One of the few areas in employment law where the claim of unconscionability has been
invoked concerns provisions for arbitration. See generally SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 20, at
§ 12.04. See also Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 535 N.E.2d 643, 538
N.Y.S.2d 513 (1989) (sustaining a boilerplate arbitration provision in a real estate broker's contract
as against unconscionability and public policy grounds). At one point, a provision requiring regis-
tered brokers to arbitrate all employment disputes with their employees, required by the rules of
various stock exchanges, was held unconscionable. Hope v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 147,
175 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982). But these have more recently been
enforced on the ground that SEC approval of the exchange rules is determinative of the question of
fairness. Heily v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 255, 248 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1988), cert denied, 489
U.S. 1013 (1989). The SEC rules are set out at 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144 (May 16, 1989).
23. Estreicher, supra note 1, at 768.
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ployer's stated terms.24 But, "it is quite another matter for an employer
by a unilateral promulgation to require an employee to submit to arbitra-
tion claims the employee may have stemming from an independent
source in external law." 25 He does not explain why distinction should be
drawn. The descriptive claim, I submit, is questionable; and if the pre-
scriptive claim is sound, it should place in question Professor Estreicher's
willingness to submit public claims to private arbitration under form con-
tracts of employment containing boilerplate arbitration provisions.
The FAA requires the submission to arbitration where there is a
"written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving
interstate commerce" as well as "an agreement in writing" to submit as
part of such a transaction. Professor Estreicher identifies the latter with
"written bilateral employment agreements." 26 But the FAA never uses
the word "bilateral." Neither does it, unlike the Statute of Frauds, re-
quire a signed instrument. 27 The FAA-and most cognate state laws-
merely requires a "written provision," which need not be part of a bilat-
eral contract. As Professor Estreicher concedes, a written arbitration
provision made part of a unilateral commercial transaction-whereby a
seller or buyer, upon receiving the other's business form that includes an
arbitration clause, does no more than ship or order a good respectively-
would be binding upon the parties.28
Professor Estreicher attempts to surmount this obstacle by question-
ing whether unilaterally promulgated employer rules are really contracts
at all: to enforce them the courts have "dispensed with requirements of
mutuality of obligation, independent consideration or detrimental reli-
ance;"' 29 they have been held binding even when not generally distributed
to employees; 30 and they are subject to subsequent modification or revo-
cation.31 Thus, he finds it difficult to ground the enforcement of such
policies on "unilateral contract theory as conventionally formulated, ' 32
24. Id. at 771.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Medical Dev. Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.
1973); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. McKay, 763 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. App. 1989) (individual
employment case). By way of contrast, Georgia's recent revision of its Arbitration Code exempts,
"Any contract relating to terms and conditions of employment unless the clause agreeing to arbitrate
is initiated by all signatories at the time of the execution of the agreement." GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
2(c)(9) (1988).
28. Estreicher, supra note 1, at 769 (citing Joseph Muller Corp., Zurich v. Commonwealth
Petrochemicals, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 769-70.
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and suggests they are best thought of by analogy to administrative rather
than to contract law. 33 None of this will do.
The courts have not dispensed with mutuality of obligation: the
doctrine requires that both the employer and the employee be bound by
the employer's rules, as they are under unilaterally promulgated em-
ployer rules. 34 Independent consideration is not required of a unilateral
employment contract as "conventionally formulated," for the perform-
ance of services constitutes both acceptance and consideration. 35 All
contracts are subject to modification. In at-will employment, a unilateral
change in employer policy is an "offer" that works a modification when
the employee "accepts" by continuance in service. 36 But the employer's
power to unilaterally change employer policy, for example, to lower the
wage or to abrogate a benefit, does not deprive its currently stated wage
rate or benefit policy of contractual status under conventionally formu-
lated contract law. Although some jurisdictions have (rightly) scouted
any need for employees to show knowledge of and express reliance on the
employer policy in order to render it contractually binding, the reasoning
is not an exotic private law borrowing from public law. Rather the result
has its origin in the well established contract law of business usage;37 and
that body of law says nothing at all to those situations where the em-
ployee in fact was made aware of the employer policy at the time of hire.
In sum, and:
[e]xcept in those instances where a candidate for hire has significant
bargaining power, there is usually little or no actual bargaining over
terms and conditions of employment. Commonly, the employee takes
the job on the terms that the employer expressly or impliedly states.
When an employee accepts a job offer, a contract has been made even
though the acceptance is of terms unilaterally stated. Accordingly,
courts hold employers contractually bound by policies such as sever-
ance pay or bonuses that are unilaterally promulgated. Indeed, many
of these policies may be found in the very same handbooks that contain
provisions on termination. 38
A provision for binding arbitration of "any dispute, claim or contro-
versy arising out of employment or the termination of employment" con-
33. Id.
34. SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 20, at § 1.06 (and the authority collected in n.76).
35. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.4, at 109 (1982). See also SPECTER & FINKIN, supra
note 20, at § 1.04 (and the authority collected in n.53), and § 2.09 (discussing the "additional consid-
eration" rule required for contracts of "lifetime" employment).
36. SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 20, at § 3.03.
37. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work- Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L.
REV. 733, 748 n.68 (citing inter alia Orton & Steinbrenner Co. v. Miltonberger, 74 Ind. App. 462,
129 N.E. 47 (1920)) (posted notice governing bonuses binds employer as to payment to employee
who had no knowledge of its precise terms).
38. Id. at 745.
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tamined in a compendium of unilaterally promulgate employer policies is
not distinguishable from other provisions governing, for example, bo-
nuses, seniority, vacations and employee benefits, or from rules gov-
erning progressive discipline and termination contained in the very same
document. If the presence of a signed contract is dispositive, all that the
employer would need to do is have the employee sign an application for
employment expressly incorporating the relevant arbitration provision of
the employee manual. This, in fact, would be very much like the practice
in the securities industry, where a brokerage employee's signing of an
application for employment, incorporating the relevant exchange's arbi-
tration rule, has been held to satisfy the FAA's "written provision" re-
quirement.3 9 So we come full circle, to the form contract that Professor
Estreicher would enforce as to federal labor protective law, subject only
to his proposed accommodation.
The choice is exactly as Professor Estreicher puts it: to reserve pub-
lic law questions for de novo judicial determination, subject to whatever
weight the courts chose to give a prior arbitration between the parties, as
Gardner-Den ver/'O Barrentine,41 and McDonald v. City of West Branch42
suggest, or to defer to arbitration subject to some level of judicial review.
Professor Estreicher, in arguing for the latter, distinguishes these cases
on the ground that they rest: (1) on the union's special role in adminis-
tering the grievance arbitration procedure-its authority to compromise
the individual claim for the sake of the common good-that is not pres-
ent in the individual contract case; and, (2) upon the lack of real, individ-
ual assent in collective bargaining to "waive" the public for a private
forum. He does make a case for the first distinction, but it alone would
not seem to be dispositive, for it does not speak to the situation where the
union has in fact aggressively pursued the discrimination claim to the
utmost before the arbitrator.43
39. See SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 20, at § 12.02 (and the authority collected in n.24).
Compare Brown v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 969 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(employee's omission of affirmative acknowledgement of arbitration clause, question 8 in Form U- 4,
renders dispute non-arbitrable) with Zdeb v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 674 F. Supp. 812 (D. Colo.
1987) (exchange rules binding even in the absence of express employee agreement).
40. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
41. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
42. 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (arbitration of discharge of public employee not preclusive of suit pred-
icated upon discharge as violative of the first amendment).
43. In fact, in his zeal to press this distinction, Professor Estreicher makes it bear little more
weight than it can hold, for he extends this distinction even to the Court's questioning of arbitral
competence to apply external law. "Here, too," he opines, "it is possible to read the Court's lan-
guage in light of a labor arbitrator who sits primarily to adjudicate claims under the contract and to
resolve a dispute to which the participants are the employer and the union, with no formal involve-
ment of the individual employee." Estreicher, supra note 1, at 780-81. But the Court's reservation
on this account, of arbitral competence, was not grounded in the union's function in labor arbitra-
[Vol. 66:799
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As to the second distinction, there may be as little actual assent to
the sweeping effect of the arbitration provision in an individual con-
tract-a form agreement, an application incorporating the employer's ar-
bitration policy by reference, or a compendium of employer policies
supplied at the time of hire-as there is to one in a collective agreement.
In all these cases, the employee takes the job on the terms established,
unilaterally or collectively, with little or no thought of whether the em-
ployer might violate some labor protective law in the future and of
whether the employee is making an election of remedies for such future
misconduct when entering employment.
Professor Estreicher argues that, "It is not always clear that even
unsophisticated workers lacking access to counsel are always better off
with a rule requiring resort to civil courts rather than arbitration to pur-
sue their statutory claims.""4 But, as his discussion of Gardner-Denver
illuminates, that is not the choice. The question is not whether an arbi-
tration conducted on behalf of an unsophisticated worker, one who lacks
access to counsel, should be allowed, but whether arbitration should pre-
clude the possibility of a subsequent de novo judicial determination of
that employee's statutory rights. Professor Estreicher sees no reason
why contract rights-rights which may be "considerably more impor-
tant" 45 to the employee-should be entrusted to arbitrators, but statu-
tory rights should not. The reason, it seems to me, in addition to
practical considerations of arbitral competence, systematic bias in the ar-
bitral process, and any imbalance in resources or representation, is that
these statutory rights are not only for the employee's benefit, they are
expressions of public policy, designed to achieve public ends, that are
best entrusted to public tribunals for their vindication.
III. ARBITRATION UNDER EMPLOYER POLICIES
If an employer establishes an internal grievance procedure to render
a "final and binding" resolution of an employee's grievance, Professor
Estreicher inquires whether employees should be able to "bypass the des-
ignated mechanism and repair to the civil courts."46 The question he
actually poses, however, is not only whether the procedure must be ex-
hausted but, more importantly, whether its exhaustion is preclusive of a
tion in contrast to arbitration directly with the individual. It was grounded in the fact that arbitra-
tors aren't judges. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 57; Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. at 743; McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. at 290.
44. Estreicher, supra note 1, at 782 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 769.
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suit for breach of the underlying substantive contractual obligation-
whether "final and binding" means just that. As I read it, Professor Es-
treicher would defer to the final disposition of an arbitral body, limited,
however, to its application of employer policy. Unlike the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, which places a limit on the ability
of a public employer to condition an express guaranty of job security
upon procedurally gross means of termination, 47 the private sector em-
ployee's only claim is in contract; and so, in this setting, Professor Es-
treicher suggests that the employee must take the "bitter with the
sweet."'48 He acknowledges that some courts have refused to require ex-
haustion where the internal machinery is procedurally gross, the theoret-
ical justification for which is grounded in the doctrine of illusory
promises.49 But, on the explicit assumption that "the dispute mechanism
does not give rise to difficulties on illusory promise ... grounds," and:
Without denying the potential for unfair outcomes in some situations,
I question whether courts as a matter of their common law authority
may legitimately rewrite the contract to render enforceable the sub-
stantive contractual commitment contained in the policy while declar-
ing ineffective the accompanying dispute-mechanism term.50
In any event, he sees no such problem where the procedure is not wholly
an internal one, but provides for arbitration by an outside neutral; and
any objection even to that would be mitigated where provision is made
for "competent representation of the employee's interest,"51 such as a
system of "employee advocates" housed in the personnel department or
by provision of peer representatives.
The conclusion, quoted above, follows only if the assumption-the
lack of an illusory promise-is sound. But Professor Estreicher does not
attend to the law of illusory promises; indeed, he scoffs at it:
[I]f the employer can unilaterally revoke or modify the commitments
contained in its policy manual, it seems difficult to understand why the
employer cannot also insist that disputes under the policy be commit-
ted to a designated procedure for final, binding resolution. 52
It is not enough to point out that the conclusion does not follow
from the premise-that the possibility of future abrogation is irrelevant
to the ability of the provision, currently in effect, to withstand attack or
illusory promise grounds--or that promissory estoppel might well limit
47. Id. at 771 n.53 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
48. Id. (citing Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974),
rejected as a constitutional proposition in Loudermill).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 770-71.
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the effectiveness of a retroactive abrogation. 53 What requires attention is
the doctrine itself. The fundamental principle, reflected in a variety of
employment cases, is that an employer cannot reserve to itself the power
to declare its underlying obligation an illusion.M It follows from this
principle that an employer cannot give an assurance of fairness, or of job
security, and reserve to itself an unreviewable final authority to decide
whether it has acted fairly or discharged wrongfully. Whether or not the
employee may be compelled to exhaust the procedure, she may not be
precluded from an action for breach of contract on the underlying obliga-
tion; a contrary result would make the employer (directly or acting more
subtly through those under its control) a judge in its own cause of ac-
tion. 55 Academic tenure, for example, would afford no protection if a
private institution's board of trustees could preclude judicial vindication
by reserving to itself "final and binding" authority to determine whether
there was cause to dismiss a faculty member after exhausting an intramu-
ral hearing procedure.5 6
This is not to say that deference should not be given the "final"
decision of an adequately neutral body;57 and where the procedure termi-
nates before a truly neutral external adjudicator, the case for judicial def-
erence is strengthened considerably. But two closely related features of
53. SPECTER & FINKIN, supra note 20, at § 3.03 (and the authority collected in nn. 18 and 19).
54. Thus an employer may not enter upon a contract of fixed duration while reserving to itself
the power to terminate earlier for no reason. See, eg., Carter v. Bradlee, 245 A.D. 49, 280 N.Y.S.
368, aff'd, 269 N.Y. 664, 200 N.E. 48 (1936), followed in Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc.,
755 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1985). See also King v. Control Systematologists, Inc., 479 So. 2d 955 (La.
App. 1985), cert. denied, 482 So. 2d 630 (La. 1986); Yazujian v. J. Rich Steers, Inc., 195 Misc. 694,
89 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Dallas Hotel v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
An employer's reservation of "sole discretion" to pay a commission may not defeat an obligation to
pay. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 243 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1957); Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell,
727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Allen D. Shadron, Inc. v. Cole, 101 Ariz. 122, 416 P.2d 555, aff'd,
101 Ariz. 341, 419 P.2d 520 (1966). Similarly, an employer may not obligate itself to pay a bonus
while disclaiming a legal obligation to pay. See, e.g., Cinelli v. American Home Prods. Corp., 785
F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1986); George A. Fuller Co. v. Brown, 15 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1926); Patterson v.
Brooks, 285 Ala. 349, 232 So. 2d 598 (1970); Ellis v. Emhart Mfg. Co., 150 Conn. 501, 191 A.2d 546
(1963); Wellington v. Con P. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358, 268 S.W.2d 396 (1925);
Molbey v. Hunter Hosiery, Inc., 102 N.H. 422, 158 A.2d 288 (1960); Oiler v. Dayton Reliable Tool
& Mfg. Co., 42 Ohio App. 2d 26, 326 N.E.2d 691 (1974); Goudie v. HNG Oil Co., 711 S.W.2d 716
(Tex. App. 1986). Nor may it promise benefits while disclaiming a legal obligation to pay. See, e.g.,
Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn. 357, 165 A. 205 (1933); Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 274
Mich. 318, 264 N.W. 385 (1936); Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden, 129 Ohio St. 375, 195 N.E. 697
(1935); Schofield v. Zion's Co-op Merchantile Ind., 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934).
55. See e.g., Cross & Brown Co. v. Nelson, 4 A.D.2d 501, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1957); Burger v.
Jan Garment Co., 52 Luz. L. Reg. 33 (Pa. Com. Plas 1962).
56. McConnell v. Howard University, 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Manes v. Dallas Baptist
College, 638 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App. 1982) (writ of error refused, no reversible error).
57. Cf Swartout v. Precision Castparts Corp., 83 Or. App. 203, 730 P.2d 1270 (1986) (em-
ployer bound by the "final" decision of its own internal grievance committee favorable to employee);
Lehmann v. Board of Trustees of Whitman College, 89 Wash. 2d 874, 576 P.2d 397 (1978) (same).
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such an arbitration system seem to me to be critical to its integrity, so to
justify judicial deference-the ability of the parties jointly to select the
"final" decisionmaker, and the ability of the grievant to be represented by
any counsel of his or her choice.5 8 Indeed, the latter plays back upon the
former. Professor Estreicher observes that the "repeat player" problem
may be mitigated by the role of plaintiff's counsel in the individual em-
ployment setting, who may be a repeat player in the selection of future
arbitrators. An allowance of representation by a union of the individ-
ual's selection (or counsel supplied by it), which may see such representa-
tion as an effective means of securing an organizational base and which
may be an active repeat player in future arbitral selection would go far to
solve the problem. Where such independence of representation is lack-
ing, the grievance-arbitration system would appear to be inherently
skewed in favor of the employer and, whether or not there is an obliga-
tion to exhaust, should not be treated as a genuine arbitration for the
purpose of judicial deference even as to the employee's contract rights.
IV. THE "COMPANY UNION" PROBLEM
Professor Estreicher also confronts the design of such unilaterally
promulgated grievance-arbitration plans with respect to their passing
muster under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
prohibition on "company unions." He notes a "debate of sorts" between
those who view "only one form of collective representation of employee
interests" as permissible, and others who are more tolerant of employee
participative mechanisms as a means of "promoting communication and
cooperation between the firm and its employees." 5 9 But he sees it as un-
necessary to resolve that larger debate in order to reach the narrower
question of the allowable limits of employee representation as part of
such a grievance-arbitration system. The maintenance of such a system,
he argues, ending before an external neutral, does not constitute the crea-
tion of a "company union," and, for section 8(a)(2) purposes, it does not
matter "whether the employee-advocate is enlisted from the same job
class as the claimant or from the firm's human resources department, or
whether the employee advocate is chosen randomly or selected by the
58. Interestingly, one of the reasons Professor Estreicher gives for distinguishing the arbitration
of public law questions under collective agreements is the lack of individual control over the presen-
tation of his or her grievance. Estreicher, supra note 1, at 781. I fail to see why this should be of any
less significance to the individual, nonunionized employee as to contract claims that Professor Es-
treicher concedes may be more important to the employee than a labor protective provision. Id. at
782.
59. Id. at 773.
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claimant." 6
Despite the effort to decline engagement in the larger debate over
the contemporary significance of section 8(a)(2), the disposition of the
instant question necessarily implicates that debate. It cannot be avoided.
And, as we shall see, it does---or should-make a difference who the
"6employee advocate" is.
Professor Estreicher's premise is that, "It is only the element of col-
lective representation of employee interests that triggers" the policy un-
derlying section 8(a)(2), "that the employer is attempting to undermine
the conditions for forming a truly autonomous institution for the purpose
of collective representation." 61 From this it follows that "the mere use of
an employee-advocate" poses no such threat. I do not believe Professor
Estreicher's analysis is faithful to either the text or setting of section
8(a)(2).
An employer is forbidden to dominate or interfere in the formation
or administration of a "labor organization," and, at first blush, it is not
obvious that a unilaterally promulgated grievance-arbitration policy es-
tablishes a "labor organization." On that, however, the expansive statu-
tory definition must be attended to. A "labor organization" is defined as:
[A]ny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee repre-
sentation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with em-
ployers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.62
Is the employer's grievance-arbitration policy an "employee representa-
tion plan"? It is a plan whereby employees are to be represented in the
matter of their grievances. Do employees "participate" in it? They do,
under the configurations Professor Estreicher discusses, as employee
"representatives." Do these representatives function even "in part" to
"deal" with the employer concerning "grievances"? That is precisely the
purpose; indeed, it is unimaginable that there would not be a course of
60. Id. at 774. Professor Estreicher speaks to both employee participation in a wholly intramu-
ral adjudicative body, along the line of Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 275 (1977), and
to employee representation as a part of a system that terminates before an external neutral adjudica-
tor. The former involves not only the "company union" issue Professor Estreicher discusses, but
whether the employee adjudicators are rendered members of management by virtue of their partici-
pation. That problem becomes especially acute when professional employees are implicated. See
College of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery, 265 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 295 (1982), and FHP, Inc.,
274 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1141 (1985). See also Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers From
Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775 (1989). Both are interesting ques-
tions, worthy of extended discussion. But inasmuch as the role of arbitrators in nonunion employ-
ment is the major theme of Professor Estreicher's paper, this comment is limited to that question.
61. Estreicher, supra note 1, at 774 (emphasis added).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1986).
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dealing between the employee's advocate and the company's representa-
tive both prior to and during the arbitration, in an effort to explore ave-
nues of possible settlement, to narrow issues, to seek stipulations as to
remedy and the like, and to agree upon more technical matters such as
the production of witnesses and documents.
More important, the gravamen of section 8(a)(2) is not limited to
alternative forms of collective bargaining. From World War I on
through the 1920s a variety of works councils and representation plans
were assayed as a product of progressive reform-to involve the workers
in some organic way in the determination of the terms and conditions of
their working lives.63 Some councils or plans were the product of good
faith efforts by "progressive" employers better to realize an industrial
democracy, such as the extensive plan at the Filene store in Boston.64
Others had their origin in more cynical efforts to counter unionization,
such as the much-publicized plan instituted at the Colorado Fuel and
Iron Company in the wake of the infamous "Ludlow massacre" of
1914.65 All these plans invariably provided a procedure for the resolu-
tion of grievances, either by appeal to the managerial hierarchy via an
intramural representative, by final resolution of a joint worker-manage-
ment committee or works council, or, under some plans-including,
prominently, that adopted by management for the Colorado Fuel and
Iron Company-for final and binding decision of a jointly selected exter-
nal neutral arbitrator. 66 But all were intended by Congress to be gov-
erned by the broad sweep of then section 8(2) whether they were
enlightened experiments or cynical manipulations.
In sum, the National Labor Relations Act says nothing at all to a
nonunion employer's prerogative to establish a grievance procedure
which allows an employee individually to appeal to the managerial hier-
archy or to an external neutral. What the employer may not do is devise
a plan that says to the employee, "Here is your representative for the
presentation of your grievance irrespective of your personal choice"
63. See generally E. MILLER, WORKMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN INDUSTRIAL GOVERNMENT
(1922); C. FRENCH, THE SHOP COMMITTEE IN THE UNITED STATES (1923); E. BURTON, EM-
PLOYEE REPRESENTATION (1926).
64. M. LADAMME, THE FILENE STORE (1930).
65. B. SELEKMAN & M. VAN KLEECK, EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN COAL MINES: A
STUDY OF THE INDUSTRIAL REPRESENTATION PLAN OF THE COLORADO FUEL AND IRON COM-
PANY (1924) [hereinafter SELEKMAN & VAN KLEECK].
66. E. BURTON, supra note 63, at 174; C. FRENCH, supra note 63, at 48-49; E. MILLER, supra
note 63, at 61; SELEKMAN & VAN KLEECK, supra note 65, at 66-67. See also, I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 125-26 (Commemorative Ed. 1985) (colloquy
with President Green of the AFL concerning inter alia the arbitration plan in effect for the Chrysler
Corporation) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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whether chosen by election, 67 by random selection, or by the company's
personnel department.
This is not to say that weighty policy arguments could not be made
for such devices. Henry Dennison, industrialist, Progressive reformer,
and member of the old National Labor Board argued powerfully before
the Senate's committee that forms of worker cooperation serve as a inval-
uable supplement to unionism; that employee representation plans of the
progressive type-not sham unions--establish "a basis for wholesome
mutual business relationship between management and workers [that]
should be cultivated as seeding ground or laboratories from which we
may learn, not dug up ' 68 by the then proposed section 8(2). One may
well come to the conclusion, as the Sixth Circuit has, that "the adver-
sarial model of labor relations in an anachronism, '69 even though the
contemporary rhetoric of "cooperation" and "participation" is indistin-
guishable from the reformist language of the Progressive period. But,
contrary to Professor Estreicher, that is not a choice for the labor
Board-or the courts-to make. Congress has made that choice categor-
ically, and if chose unwisely, or if contemporary circumstances require a
refashioning of the rules, the only legitimate agency of change is
legislative.
67. As an elected employee representative at the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company observed,
the men "won't present their grievances to the representatives they elect." SELEKMAN & VAN
KLEECK, supra note 65, at 89.
68. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 66, at 438 (testimony of Henry Dennison). One student
of Dennison's employee participation plan concluded that it was "very largely the product of the
employees." E. BURTON, supra note 62, at 85.
69. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 1982).

